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Abstract The objective of this research is to discuss the direction of the bias of the
existing estimates of genuine savings (also known as adjusted net savings). Such estimates
rely on observed prices and quantities of investment and natural resource extraction. This
has two consequences: first, it causes an overestimation of the shadow price of productive
natural resources; second, it leads to omitting the depreciation of environmental services
and amenities. We use simple numerical models to determine the path of optimal devel-
opment under different assumptions. We find that the existing estimates of genuine savings
are likely to be biased upward for countries with high levels of pollution, and biased
downward for natural resource extracting countries.
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1 Introduction
During the last two decades, a growing body of literature has focused on defining and
measuring the sustainability of economic development.1
Economists have broadly relied on simple dynamic models based on intertemporal
social welfare functions with a constant discount rate. Research has produced an indicator
of sustainability currently accepted by most scholars, named genuine savings, given by the
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sum of the quantities of net investments in all forms of capital, valued at appropriate
shadow prices.
If the definition of capital is exhaustive—i.e. if it includes all existing physical, human,
social and natural assets—and if shadow prices are constant within each period—i.e. if
they exclude capital gains—genuine savings are informative on sustainability in two ways.
First, they provide a two-way test of local sustainability, defined as non-decreasing in-
tertemporal social welfare. Positive genuine savings indicate that the future generation will
enjoy a larger stock of productive assets—implying higher intertemporal social welfare—
relative to the current one. Symmetrically, negative genuine savings indicate that the set of
productive assets is decreasing, and a smaller set of opportunities is left as bequest to those
who follow.
If a global definition of sustainability is adopted, i.e. non-decreasing levels of utility at
any future time on the path of optimal development, genuine savings allow performing
only a one-way test of sustainability (Pezzey 2004). More specifically, negative genuine
savings imply that utility will sooner or later drop below the current level. On the contrary,
positive genuine savings do not guarantee that, on the optimal development path, utility
will always be greater than today.
The objective of this research is to discuss the validity of the estimates of genuine
savings presented in the existing empirical literature. More specifically, we aim to deter-
mine the direction of the bias due to overlooking the full set of interactions between natural
resources and consumer utility.
The shadow prices of the stocks of physical, human, social and natural assets are key
elements for the measurement of genuine savings. In general, the shadow price—measured
in units of utility—is equal to the present value of the changes in the flow of future utilities
due to an increment of one unit in the current stock. Mathematically, in the theory of
optimal control, shadow prices are given by the values of the costate variables when the
Hamiltonian is maximized.
When the use of a natural resource is associated with the generation of pollution, its
shadow price decreases. The reduction in its stock represents a smaller loss for the future
generation, as it will be accompanied by lower polluting emissions. Several articles discuss
the problem from a theoretical point of view (Hartwick 1990; Hamilton and Clemens 1999;
Hamilton 2000, 2003; Heal 1998; Neumayer 2003; Perman et al. 2003). However, the
empirical literature surprisingly overlooks the point. The existing estimates of genuine
savings (e.g. the Adjusted Net Savings of the World Bank) assess the depreciation of the
stock of productive natural capital using the observed rent, given by the difference between
observed market price and extraction cost2 (World Bank 1997, 2005). Omitting to subtract
the value of the environmental damage from the market price leads to underestimating
genuine savings—a counterintuitive result, as noted by Neumayer (2003). The underesti-
mation is particularly relevant for natural resource extracting countries, for which the
World Bank’s Adjusted Net Savings are at times negative—a result that originated a broad
literature on the natural resource curse (see for example Atkinson and Hamilton 2003).
To explore the consequences of overlooking the interaction between environment and
utility on the estimates of genuine savings, we compare three simple theoretical models. In
the first, the interaction between environmental quality and utility is omitted. Welfare
maximization determines the path of development chosen by an economy in which the
environment is external to the markets. As the empirical literature relies on observed
market prices and quantities, and in real-world economies environmental effects are rarely
2 Average rather than marginal extraction costs are considered, as information on the latter is unavailable.
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internalized, we argue that existing measures of genuine savings are consistent with the
solution of this model.3 In the second model, extraction and employment of natural
resources for production negatively affect an otherwise constant flow of environmental
services, on which consumer utility depends. The two models share production technology
and size of capital stocks, and differ only in the expression for the utility of the repre-
sentative consumer—in one case function of produced goods only, in the other of produced
goods and environmental services. Because of the different utility function, all quantities
(produced, extracted, consumed, etc.) and shadow prices differ on the paths of optimal
development consistent with the two models. The comparison of the two solutions allows
isolating the error in the choice of the path of optimal development due to ignoring the
connection between production and consumption, via pollution. Eventually, in the third
theoretical model we relax the hypothesis of a constant flow of environmental services by
introducing a second stock of environmental goods, which provide amenities directly to
consumers. The pursuit of optimal development implies making decisions on three sets of
assets: man-made capital and productive natural resources—like in the first two models—
and environmental amenities.
We derive the analytical expressions for shadow prices and genuine savings for the
three models. In the first two, genuine savings miss one term related to the decrease in the
stock of environmental amenities. Further comparisons are not straightforward because
each model determines different paths of optimal development, with different values for all
variables (quantities, productivities, marginal costs, marginal utilities, etc.). For this rea-
son, also when the expressions are formally identical, their values will generally differ. For
example, on the optimal path, in all the models the shadow price of produced capital is
equal to the marginal utility of consumption; however, unless we assume constant marginal
utility of consumption, the values will differ in each model. We, nonetheless, attempt to
determine under which conditions omitting the environment leads to the overestimation of
the shadow price of productive natural resources.
To overcome the difficulties in the comparison of the analytical expressions for genuine
savings, we develop a computable version of the three models using GAMS. We employ
specific functional forms for production and consumer utility, and determine the path of
optimal development and the optimal value of control variables (consumption and
extraction of productive natural resources and environmental amenities), stocks (man-
made capital and natural resources), and shadow prices at each period t.
The comparison between the optimal solutions of the three models shows that ignoring
negative external effects on utility leads to a faster exploitation of productive natural
resources. Symmetrically, the shadow price of productive natural resources is overesti-
mated, as the marginal environmental damage is not deducted. Overestimating the optimal
quantity of extraction and the shadow price of the relative stock leads to underestimating
genuine savings. This supports the intuition—previously introduced—that existing esti-
mates of genuine savings for resource-extracting countries may be excessively pessimistic.
Overlooking the relationship between consumer utility and environmental amenities
leads to an overestimation of genuine savings—because of the omission of amenities
depreciation. Most existing estimates of genuine savings attempt to account for the social
costs of pollution. For example, the World Bank’s Adjusted Net Savings subtract the value
3 Although the expression for genuine savings is formally identical to the one obtained from a model in
which consumers’ utility is also a function of the stocks of environmental resources, in this latter case
quantities and prices for the calculation of genuine savings would be different from those observed in an
economy in which the environment is external to the markets.
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of the environmental damage due to the emissions of particulates and carbon dioxide.
However, such correction is affected by two kinds of bias. First, observed quantities of
polluting emissions exceed those that would be observed on the path of optimal devel-
opment, as the lack of Pigouvian taxes leads to higher levels of emissions. Second, the
shadow price differs from the one on the optimal development path. If the estimates are
based on the marginal willingness to pay or accept, the price is overestimated, as emissions
exceed the optimal quantity and marginal environmental damages have positive first and
second derivatives. On the contrary, the price is underestimated if abatement costs are
considered, as observed abatement is smaller than the optimal value and only the cheapest
units of pollution are being prevented.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical models,
derives the conditions for a path of optimal development, compares the expressions for
genuine savings, and attempts to analytically determine the direction of the bias due to
ignoring the relationship between consumer utility, environmental services and production.
Section 3 introduces the numerical models, and discusses the difference between the paths
of optimal development and the measures of genuine savings, in light of the analytical
results from Sect. 2. Section 4 concludes.
2 The path of optimal development in three alternative theoretical models
Assume the existence of two types of environmental goods. The first is a productive input.
Its use generates pollution, and therefore reduces environmental quality. The second
produces amenities that increase consumer utility. No externality is internalized, so that the
environment is considered only as provider of inputs for production. Utility in each period
is a function of commodity consumption (Ct) only. Production is a function of the stock of
physical capital (Kt) and of the amount of productive natural resource extracted in the
period (Rt). For simplicity, assume that physical capital does not depreciate, that R is not
renewable and that its extraction is not costly. The functions of utility and production
are time invariant. The social welfare maximization problem can be written as follows
(model 1):
max W
C;R
¼
Z1
t
UðCsÞerðstÞds s.t.
_Kt ¼ FðKt; RtÞ  Ct
_St ¼ Rt
ð1:1Þ
The initial stocks of K and S are exogenously determined (K0 = K0, S0 = S0). The fol-
lowing holds: UC [ 0, UCC \ 0, FK [ 0, FKK \ 0, FR [ 0, FRR \ 0. The current value
Hamiltonian (at time t) and four necessary conditions for an optimum are4:
H ¼ UðCÞ þ ck  ½FðK; RÞ  C þ cS  ½R ð1:2Þ
4 The variables H, C, K, R, S, all the shadow prices c and the derivatives of U and F with respect to C, K and
R change every period and should be indexed by time. To simplify the notation, in what follows we omit the
subscript t.
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cK ¼ UC
cS ¼ UCFR
ð1:3Þ
_cK
cK
¼ r  FK
_cS
cS
¼ r
ð1:4Þ
Equations 1.3 define the expressions for the shadow prices of man-made capital and pro-
ductive natural resources. The first states that, on the optimal path, in each period the shadow
price of the stock of man-made capital K equals the marginal utility of consumption.
According to the second, the shadow price of the stock of the productive natural resource
equals the utility given by the consumption of the marginal product of one unit of S.
Equations 1.4 define the dynamic of the shadow prices. The first, combined with (1.3),
states that on the optimal path of development the marginal utility of consumption grows at
a rate which compensates for the rate of intertemporal preference, net of the return of the
investment of one unit of capital—i.e. net of the marginal product of capital. The second
states that the shadow price of the stock of productive natural resources grows at a rate that
compensates intertemporal preference. This is the well-known Hotelling rule (Hotelling
1931) in the special case of costless extraction and can be written as follows:
UCFR
 
UCFR
¼ r ð1:5Þ
Some algebraic manipulation provides the expression for the optimal growth of the mar-
ginal product of R:
_FR
FR
¼ FK ð1:6Þ
The growth rate of the marginal product of the natural resource (FR) equals the marginal
product of capital (FK), hence it is always positive. At least if the production function is
separable in K and R, this implies that natural resource extraction is highest in the first
period, and then decreases across time.
Genuine savings measured in units of consumption5 are equal to the sum of the value of
the change in all forms of assets, in this case man-made capital and productive natural
capital, and are given by the following expression:
GS1
UC
¼ ½FðK; RÞ  C þ FR  ½R ð1:7Þ
The first addendum of the right hand side of expression (1.7) is the change in the quantity
of man-made capital, equal to production minus consumption. Its shadow price is nor-
malized to one. The term in square brackets in the second addendum is the change in the
stock of natural resources, equal to the extraction in the period. Its shadow price—nor-
malized by the marginal utility of consumption—is equal to the marginal product of the
natural resource (which measures the growth in utility due to the extraction and use of one
more unit of natural resource).
5 The normalization is equivalent to using the shadow price of physical capital as numeraire.
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In order to understand the bias due to ignoring environmental externalities, we consider
a different model. Consumer utility is now a function of commodity consumption and of a
flow of environmental services (Et). Examples of environmental services are carbon
sequestration, free and clean fresh water, sites for outdoor activities, clean air (affecting the
number of sun-light days per year), etc. The flow of environmental services is negatively
affected by the amount (Rt) of the stock St extracted for production purposes. The rest of
the model is identical to model 1. The social welfare maximization problem can be written
as follows (model 2):
max W
C;R
¼
Z1
t
UðCs; EðRsÞÞerðstÞds s.t.
_Kt ¼ FðKt; RtÞ  Ct
_St ¼ Rt
ð2:1Þ
The initial stocks of K and S are exogenously determined (K0 = K0, S0 = S0). In addition
to the conditions on first and second derivatives stated for model 1, the following holds:
UE [ 0, UEE \ 0, ER \ 0, ERR \ 0. The current value Hamiltonian and four necessary
conditions for an optimum are:
H ¼ UðC; EðRÞÞ þ ck  ½FðK; RÞ  C þ cS  ½R ð2:2Þ
cK ¼ UC
cS ¼ UCFR þ UEER
ð2:3Þ
_cK
cK
¼ r  FK
_cS
cS
¼ r
ð2:4Þ
Three of the four first-order conditions for an optimum are formally identical to model 1.
The specification ‘‘formally’’ is important, because the proper consideration of environ-
mental externalities implies that the value of consumption and extraction chosen every year
on the path of optimal development will be different from model 1. Furthermore, the
shadow price of the stock of productive natural resources is now reduced by the utility cost
of the environmental damage caused by production. The fact that the productive use of
natural resources determines a negative externality on environmental services makes
natural resources, ceteris paribus, less valuable.
Substituting the static conditions into the dynamic ones and rearranging we obtain
interesting insights on the difference between the two paths of optimal development. In
both models, the rate of growth of the marginal utility of consumption equals the difference
between rate of intertemporal preference and marginal product of capital. In both models,
the rate of growth of the shadow price of productive natural resources equals the rate of
intertemporal preference. For model 2, we have the following expression:
UCFR þ UEER
 
UCFR þ UEER ¼ r ð2:5Þ
Some algebraic manipulation provides the expression for the optimal growth of the mar-
ginal product of the natural resource.
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_FR
FR
¼ FK þ UEER
UCFR
 r  UEERð Þ

UEER
 !
ð2:6Þ
In model 1, the rate of growth of FR equals FK, hence it is always positive. If the pro-
duction function is separable in K and R, this implies that the extraction R is highest in the
first period and decreases across time.6 The same does not necessarily hold in model 2,
where the marginal product of R can decrease across time if the second term on the right
hand side of expression (2.6) is negative and sufficiently large. As UEERUCFR\0, a necessary
condition for this to happen is
UEERð Þ

UEER
\r—i.e. the growth rate of the marginal environ-
mental damage be smaller than the rate of intertemporal preference. This can happen if the
former is negative, or is positive but sufficiently small. In model 2, it is possible to envisage a
scenario in which the extraction of productive natural resources is initially small, and then
grows across time. On the contrary, a positive and high growth rate of marginal externalities
is associated with an increase in the marginal product of R, and reinforces the result of
model 1, with large initial extraction that rapidly decreases across time.
Genuine savings—in units of consumption—are given by the following expression:
GS2
UC
¼ F K; Rð Þ  C½  þ UCFR þ UEERð Þ
UC
 R½  ð2:7Þ
Formally, the expression broadly replicates the one obtained from model 1. The only
difference lies in the shadow price of productive natural resources.
Assume that the solution of the maximization problem associated with model 2 provides
insights on the optimal path of development. Imagine, on the other hand, that model 1
better describes the way in which the world economy actually works—because most
relationships between production, environmental quality and utility are ignored by the
markets. The theory tells us that development is not sustainable if the genuine saving
measured on the path of optimal development is negative (Pezzey 2004). However,
existing estimates of genuine savings are consistent with expression (1.7) from model 1
(GS1), rather than with expression (2.7). The estimates of GS1 differ from the correct
measure GS2 because: (a) the quantities of production, consumption, extraction (and
therefore the marginal utility of consumption, the marginal product of capital and natural
resources) are not the ones one would have if the social planner was solving the correct
maximization problem; (b) expression (1.7) fails to consider the fact that the shadow price
of productive natural resources is reduced by the negative externalities on the utility of the
representative consumer. In model 1, the use of productive natural resources is likely to be
faster and the relative shadow price is likely to be higher than in model 2. Therefore GS1 is
likely to represent an underestimation of the correct measure of genuine savings GS2.
Eventually, we consider a model in which the utility of the representative individual is
also a function of a second stock of environmental resources that provide amenities directly
for consumption. Utility in each period is a function of commodity consumption and
environmental amenities—which are positively affected by the amount of environmental
services Mt extracted from the stock Zt of renewable environmental goods, and negatively
affected by the amount Rt extracted for production purposes from the stock St. All other
6 If the production function is not separable in K and R, this does not necessarily hold, as the marginal
product of R can grow even if the amount of extraction grows, if the stock of physical capital K is higher
than in the first period.
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assumptions are common to models 1 and 2. The social welfare maximization problem can
be written as follows (model 3):
max W
C;R;M
¼
Z1
t
U Cs; E Ms; Rsð Þð Þer stð Þds s:t:
_Kt ¼ F Kt; Rtð Þ  Ct
_St ¼ Rt
_Zt ¼ h Ztð Þ  Mt
ð3:1Þ
Where h(Zt) is the function of natural renewal of the stock of environmental amenities. The
initial stocks of K, S and Z are exogenously determined (K0 = K0, S0 = S0, Z0 = Z0). In
addition to the conditions on first and second derivatives stated for model 2, the following
holds: EM [ 0, EMM \ 0. The current value Hamiltonian and six necessary conditions for
an optimum are:
H ¼ U C; E M; Rð Þð Þ þ ck  F K; Rð Þ  C½  þ cS  R½  þ cZ  h Zð Þ  M½  ð3:2Þ
cK ¼ UC
cS ¼ UCFR þ UEER
cZ ¼ UEEM
ð3:3Þ
_cK
cK
¼ r  FK
_cS
cS
¼ r
_cZ
cZ
¼ r  hZ
ð3:4Þ
Four of the six first-order conditions for an optimum are formally identical to model 2. We
find here two additional expressions. They state that the shadow price of the stock Z of
environmental amenities is equal to the marginal utility produced by one unit of envi-
ronmental amenity, and that this shadow price grows at a rate that compensates for the rate
of pure intertemporal preference, net of the gain given by the natural growth of the stock of
resource, which is a function of the existing stock.
Genuine savings in units of consumption are given by the following expression:
GS3
UC
¼ ½FðK; RÞ  C þ ðUCFR þ UEERÞ
UC
 ½R þ UEEM
UC
 ½hðZÞ  M ð3:5Þ
The first two terms of the expression for genuine savings are formally identical to the
expression derived from model 2. However, there is now a third addendum, which mea-
sures the value of the change in the stock of environmental amenities. The quantity, in
square brackets, is equal to the natural growth of the stock minus the extraction in the
period. The shadow price is equal to the marginal utility given by exploiting one more unit
of the existing stock.
As the comparison of quantities and prices for the measurement of genuine savings in
the three models requires several assumptions of separability in the utility and production
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functions, and quickly becomes untreatable, we proceed in the next section with the
analysis of the solution of equivalent numerical models.
3 Numerical models and the validity of existing measures of genuine savings
We develop and solve three discrete-time computational models—mirroring those dis-
cussed in Sect. 2—using GAMS. In these models, we assume specific functional forms for
utility and production functions, and set the key parameters to somehow arbitrary values.
Hence, the results we obtain do not hold in general. Nonetheless, running computational
models can provide useful insights on the results of the optimization problem and on the
value of genuine savings. In a second phase, we perform sensitivity analysis to test the
robustness of our results.
The full specification of the three models and the detailed results of their solution are
presented in Appendix 1 (Tables 3–5).
We focus first on the comparison of models 1 and 2, with the aim to single out the effect
of the consideration of negative externalities from extraction and use of productive natural
resources.
The comparison of the two sets of results (Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix 1) shows that,
when externalities are not properly taken into account in model 1, productive natural
resources are exploited more rapidly. This is shown in Fig. 1. Production and consumption
are initially higher (Fig. 2). Also investments are higher, as a larger stock of man-made
capital is required to compensate for exploited natural resources (and keep production high
in the following periods). In both models, consumption increases with time, as the marginal
product of capital exceeds the rate of intertemporal preference. In both models, net
investments (production net of consumption and capital depreciation) become at some
point negative. This is due to the fact that we consider a finite time horizon, and physical
capital is progressively used for consumption purposes.
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3
Fig. 1 Extraction R in the three models. Note: Solid line for model 1, dashed for model 2, dotted for
model 3
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The normalized shadow price of productive natural resources differs remarkably in the
two models: more specifically, the negative externality on amenities makes the shadow
price smaller in model 2.
The difference in the dynamic of productive natural resource extraction can be exam-
ined with reference to Eqs. 1.6 and 2.6—whose components are reported in Table 6 in
Appendix 1. In model 1, optimal exploitation requires that the rate of growth of the
marginal product of R equals the marginal productivity of man-made capital (as from
Eq. 1.6). In model 2, optimal exploitation is also affected by the relationship between the
rate of intertemporal preference and the growth rate of marginal environmental damages.
The two are practically equal in the first period. Starting from the second period, the rate of
growth of environmental damages is consistently smaller than the rate of intertemporal
preference (and soon becomes negative), therefore the second addendum of expression
(2.6) is negative. The marginal product of capital is consistently smaller in model 2 (in the
first period, and for a number of periods afterward). The consideration of the interactions
between pollution and environmental services makes the rate of growth of the marginal
product of R smaller. This implies that natural resource extraction decreases more slowly
across time—therefore, extraction is less intense in the first periods (see Fig. 1).
Summarizing, omitting environmental externalities leads to: (a) overestimating the
optimal amount of extraction of productive natural resources; (b) overestimating their
normalized shadow price; (c) overestimating the optimal quantity of investment in physical
capital. Overall, in our simulations, ignoring environmental externalities leads to an esti-
mate of genuine savings biased downward (Table 1). The sensitivity analysis presented in
Table 2 shows that this result is robust to changes in the key parameters of the two models.
We next compare models 2 and 3. The main difference is that in model 2 the formula for
genuine savings omits a negative term measuring the depreciation of the stock of amenity-
providing environmental goods. This term is negative if harvest exceeds natural growth.
Ceteris paribus, the omission biases genuine savings upward. Extraction and shadow price
of productive natural resources do not seem to be substantially affected (see Fig. 1 for the
quantity of extraction). As a consequence, production also does not change remarkably.
0.0
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3
Fig. 2 Consumption C in the three models. Note: Solid line for model 1, dashed for model 2, dotted for
model 3
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However, consumption is initially lower (see Fig. 2), determining a higher level of
investment in man-made capital. This may be due to the need of a larger stock of man-
made capital to compensate for the depletion of two stocks of natural resources. Overall,
ignoring environmental amenities leads to: (a) underestimating the optimal quantity of
investment in physical capital; (b) omitting the depreciation of the stock of amenity-
providing environmental goods. Although the two errors bias genuine savings in opposite
directions, the sensitivity analysis presented in Table 2 shows that genuine savings are
consistently smaller in model 3 than in model 2.
4 Conclusions
The objective of this research was to discuss the validity of the estimates of genuine
savings—the main indicator of sustainable development—presented in the empirical
literature.
Existing estimates of genuine savings are based on observed market prices and quan-
tities. As real-world markets do not internalize environmental externalities, such estimates
are twice biased. First, the term measuring the depreciation of the stock of productive
natural resources (for example oil) is overestimated. This is due to the fact that:
Table 1 Decomposition of genuine savings in the first period, in the three models
DK DS DZ GS
Model 1 Price 1.000a 1.594 -0.041
Quantity 1.527 -0.984
Value 1.527 -1.568
Model 2 Price 1.000a 1.206 0.371
Quantity 1.385 -0.841
Value 1.385 -1.014
Model 3 Price 1.000a 1.264 -0.29 0.182
Quantity 1.681 -0.877 1.348
Value 1.681 -1.109 -0.391
Note: a Shadow price of physical capital normalized to one
Table 2 Sensitivity analysis
Value of parameter GS1/cK GS2/cK GS3/cK
Baseline: a = b = 0.5, d = 0.05, r = 0.02 -0.041 0.371 0.181
r = 0.03 -0.133 0.301 -0.004
r = 0.01 0.046 0.429 0.312
d = 0.06 -0.231 0.170 -0.112
d = 0.04 0.149 0.574 0.460
a = 0.04 -0.129 0.418 -0.152
a = 0.06 0.071 0.366 -0.378
b = 0.04 -0.925 -0.564 -1.254
b = 0.06 (requires S0 = 3) 1.058 1.231 1.197
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(a) extraction and use are faster in the real world than they would be on the optimal
development path, because the price of pollution is not internalized; (b) the market price
exceeds the shadow price on the optimal development path. The depreciation of the stock
of productive natural capital actually represents a smaller loss for the future generation,
because it will be accompanied by a reduced amount of polluting emissions. Relying on
market prices leads to underestimating genuine savings. Second, a term measuring the
depreciation of the stock of environmental goods providing amenities to consumers is
omitted—as the market price is null. This omission leads to overestimating genuine
savings.
The two biases have opposite signs. It is therefore not possible to determine the overall
sign of the error. Nonetheless, our analysis shows that existing estimates of genuine
savings are likely to be biased upward for countries with high levels of environmental
damage from pollution, and biased downward for natural resource extracting countries.
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Appendix 1
This appendix presents three numerical models consistent with the theoretical ones dis-
cussed in Sect. 2. Model 1, which ignores the effect of environmental resources on utility,
is specified as follows:
max W
Ct ;Rt
¼
XT
t¼1
Ut  ð1 þ rÞt s:t:
Ktþ1 ¼ ð1  dÞ  Kt þ Qt  Ct
Stþ1 ¼ St  Rt
CT ¼ ð1  dÞ  KT þ QT
RT ¼ ST
ð4:1Þ
where
Ut ¼ Cat
Qt ¼ Kbt  R1bt
ð4:2Þ
The model allows for depreciation of man-made capital, at a rate d.
Model 2, which considers the negative external effects due to the extraction and use of
productive natural resources, is specified as follows:
max W
Ct ;Rt
¼
XT
t¼1
Ut  ð1 þ rÞt s:t:
Ktþ1 ¼ ð1  dÞ  Kt þ Qt  Ct
Stþ1 ¼ St  Rt
CT ¼ ð1  dÞ  KT þ QT
RT ¼ ST
ð5:1Þ
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where
Ut ¼ Cat  E1at
Et ¼ 1  Rt
2
 l 
Qt ¼ Kbt  R1bt
ð5:2Þ
Model 3, which considers also the effect of environmental amenities on the utility of the
representative consumer, is specified as follows:
max W
Ct ;Rt ;Mt
¼
XT
t¼1
Ut  ð1 þ rÞt s:t:
Ktþ1 ¼ ð1  dÞ  Kt þ Qt  Ct
Stþ1 ¼ St  Rt
Ztþ1 ¼ Zt  Mt
CT ¼ ð1  dÞ  KT þ QT
RT ¼ ST
MT ¼ ZT
ð6:1Þ
where:
Ut ¼ Cat  E1at
Et ¼ M/t  1 
Rt
2
 l 
Qt ¼ Kbt  R1bt
ð6:2Þ
In all the models, we assume the following values for the parameters:
T = 20, K1 = S1 = Z1 = 10, a = b = / = 0.5, d = 0.05, l = 2, r = 0.02.
The first-order conditions for the solution of a complete discrete-time model are derived
in Appendix 2. The results of the optimization are in Tables 3, 4 and 5. Table 6 reports the
components of Eqs. 1.6 and 2.6, explaining the dynamic of the extraction of the natural
resource.
Table 3 Optimal path of development—model 1
t cK cS/cK C Q DK R GS/cK
1 0.475 1.594 1.109 3.136 1.527 0.984 -0.041
2 0.438 1.765 1.306 3.266 1.384 0.926 -0.249
3 0.409 1.926 1.496 3.351 1.210 0.870 -0.465
4 0.386 2.080 1.676 3.395 1.013 0.816 -0.685
5 0.368 2.226 1.845 3.400 0.798 0.764 -0.902
6 0.353 2.365 2.001 3.369 0.571 0.712 -1.113
7 0.341 2.496 2.144 3.305 0.336 0.662 -1.316
8 0.332 2.622 2.272 3.212 0.097 0.613 -1.509
9 0.324 2.741 2.387 3.090 -0.144 0.564 -1.689
10 0.317 2.854 2.487 2.943 -0.384 0.516 -1.856
11 0.312 2.961 2.574 2.771 -0.623 0.468 -2.009
12 0.307 3.063 2.647 2.577 -0.859 0.421 -2.148
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Table 3 continued
t cK cS/cK C Q DK R GS/cK
13 0.304 3.160 2.708 2.362 -1.092 0.374 -2.273
14 0.301 3.252 2.756 2.127 -1.321 0.327 -2.385
15 0.299 3.339 2.794 1.874 -1.546 0.281 -2.483
16 0.298 3.422 2.821 1.603 -1.766 0.234 -2.568
17 0.297 3.501 2.837 1.314 -1.983 0.188 -2.640
18 0.296 3.576 2.845 1.009 -2.197 0.141 -2.702
19 0.296 3.647 2.845 0.689 -2.407 0.094 -2.752
20 0.297 3.715 2.837 0.352 -2.615 0.047 -2.791
Notes: cK = marginal utility of consumption; cS/cK = shadow price of the stock of productive natural
resources, in units of consumption; C = quantity consumed; Q = quantity produced; DK = quantity of net
investment; R = quantity of extraction of productive natural resources; GS/cK = value of genuine savings,
in units of consumption
Table 4 Optimal path of development—model 2
t cK cS/cK C Q DK R GS/cK
1 0.450 1.206 1.015 2.900 1.385 0.841 0.371
2 0.420 1.321 1.194 3.015 1.252 0.799 0.197
3 0.395 1.430 1.368 3.100 1.101 0.761 0.013
4 0.376 1.534 1.536 3.158 0.935 0.726 -0.178
5 0.360 1.633 1.696 3.189 0.759 0.693 -0.373
6 0.347 1.729 1.850 3.194 0.573 0.661 -0.570
7 0.336 1.821 1.996 3.176 0.380 0.630 -0.767
8 0.327 1.911 2.134 3.134 0.181 0.600 -0.964
9 0.319 1.998 2.265 3.069 -0.024 0.569 -1.160
10 0.312 2.083 2.389 2.981 -0.236 0.537 -1.354
11 0.306 2.166 2.507 2.869 -0.454 0.505 -1.547
12 0.300 2.249 2.619 2.732 -0.680 0.471 -1.739
13 0.296 2.330 2.726 2.569 -0.915 0.435 -1.929
14 0.291 2.411 2.828 2.380 -1.161 0.397 -2.119
15 0.288 2.492 2.926 2.161 -1.420 0.357 -2.309
16 0.284 2.573 3.021 1.910 -1.695 0.312 -2.499
17 0.281 2.654 3.114 1.624 -1.989 0.264 -2.690
18 0.278 2.738 3.204 1.298 -2.306 0.211 -2.883
19 0.275 2.823 3.292 0.925 -2.651 0.151 -3.077
20 0.272 2.912 3.380 0.497 -3.034 0.082 -3.272
Note: See Table 3
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Table 5 Optimal path of development—model 3
t cK cS/cK C Q DK R cZ/cS M GS/cK
1 0.373 1.264 0.781 2.961 1.681 0.877 1.348 0.290 0.181
2 0.347 1.389 1.014 3.094 1.496 0.820 1.480 0.342 -0.148
3 0.327 1.503 1.243 3.189 1.287 0.772 1.602 0.388 -0.494
4 0.311 1.610 1.462 3.250 1.064 0.730 1.716 0.426 -0.842
5 0.299 1.710 1.670 3.280 0.834 0.693 1.822 0.458 -1.186
6 0.289 1.805 1.863 3.282 0.601 0.658 1.924 0.484 -1.519
7 0.280 1.896 2.041 3.258 0.369 0.626 2.021 0.505 -1.838
8 0.273 1.983 2.205 3.208 0.137 0.594 2.114 0.522 -2.143
9 0.267 2.068 2.354 3.135 -0.093 0.562 2.204 0.534 -2.433
10 0.262 2.150 2.491 3.037 -0.322 0.531 2.291 0.544 -2.709
11 0.258 2.230 2.615 2.915 -0.552 0.498 2.377 0.550 -2.971
12 0.254 2.309 2.729 2.769 -0.785 0.465 2.461 0.554 -3.222
13 0.251 2.387 2.833 2.598 -1.021 0.429 2.544 0.557 -3.463
14 0.248 2.465 2.929 2.400 -1.264 0.392 2.628 0.557 -3.694
15 0.245 2.543 3.017 2.173 -1.516 0.352 2.711 0.557 -3.919
16 0.242 2.622 3.099 1.915 -1.780 0.308 2.794 0.555 -4.137
17 0.240 2.702 3.176 1.623 -2.059 0.260 2.879 0.552 -4.350
18 0.237 2.783 3.248 1.293 -2.358 0.207 2.966 0.547 -4.558
19 0.235 2.867 3.314 0.919 -2.681 0.148 3.055 0.542 -4.761
20 0.233 2.953 3.375 0.492 -3.035 0.080 3.148 0.536 -4.958
Notes: See Table 3. cZ/cS = Shadow price of the stock of environmental amenities, in units of consumption;
M = quantity of extraction of environmental amenities
Table 6 Dynamic of the extraction of productive natural resources in models 1 and 2, from Eqs. 1.6 and
2.6
t Model 1 Model 2
_FR
FR
FK R
_FR
FR
FK UEERUC FR UEERð Þ

UEER
UEER
UCFR
 r  UE ERð Þ

UE ER
 
R
1 0.107 0.107 0.984 0.095 0.095 -0.301 0.019 0.000 0.841
2 0.092 0.092 0.926 0.080 0.082 -0.300 0.011 -0.003 0.799
3 0.080 0.080 0.870 0.067 0.073 -0.298 0.003 -0.005 0.761
4 0.070 0.070 0.816 0.058 0.065 -0.295 -0.003 -0.007 0.726
5 0.062 0.062 0.764 0.050 0.059 -0.290 -0.009 -0.009 0.693
6 0.056 0.056 0.712 0.043 0.054 -0.284 -0.015 -0.010 0.661
7 0.050 0.050 0.662 0.037 0.049 -0.277 -0.021 -0.011 0.630
8 0.045 0.045 0.613 0.032 0.046 -0.269 -0.028 -0.013 0.600
9 0.041 0.041 0.564 0.028 0.043 -0.260 -0.034 -0.014 0.569
10 0.038 0.038 0.516 0.024 0.040 -0.249 -0.042 -0.015 0.537
11 0.034 0.034 0.468 0.021 0.038 -0.238 -0.051 -0.017 0.505
12 0.032 0.032 0.421 0.018 0.036 -0.225 -0.061 -0.018 0.471
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Appendix 2
A general discrete-time model can be written as follows:
max
Ct ;Rt ;Mt
XT
t¼1
UðCt; EðMt; RtÞÞ  ð1 þ rÞts:t:
Ktþ1  Kt ¼ FðKt; RtÞ  Ct  d  Kt
Stþ1  St ¼ gðStÞ  Rt
Ztþ1  Zt ¼ hðZtÞ  Mt
ð7:1Þ
Where g(St) is the function of natural renewal of the stock of productive natural resources.
The Hamiltonian and the first-order conditions are:
Ht ¼ UðCt; EðMt; RtÞÞ þ cKtþ1  ðFðKt; RtÞ  Ct  d  KtÞ þ cStþ1  ðgðStÞ  RtÞ
þ cZtþ1  ðhðZtÞ  MtÞ
ð7:2Þ
oHt
oCt
¼ 0 ) UCt  cKtþ1 ¼ 0
oHt
oRt
¼ 0 ) UEt ERt þ cKtþ1  FRt  cStþ1 ¼ 0 ð7:3Þ
oHt
oMt
¼ 0 ) UEt EMt  cZtþ1 ¼ 0
cKtþ1  cKt ¼ r  cKt 
oHt
oKt
) cKt ¼
1 þ FKt  d
1 þ r  c
K
tþ1
cStþ1  cSt ¼ r  cSt 
oHt
oSt
) cSt ¼
1 þ gðStÞ
1 þ r  c
S
tþ1 ð7:4Þ
cZtþ1  cZt ¼ r  cZt 
oHt
oZt
) cZt ¼
1 þ hðZtÞ
1 þ r  c
Z
tþ1
The first-order conditions can be reformulated as follows:
Table 6 continued
t Model 1 Model 2
_FR
FR
FK R
_FR
FR
FK UEERUC FR UEERð Þ

UEER
UEER
UCFR
 r  UE ERð Þ

UE ER
 
R
13 0.029 0.029 0.374 0.015 0.035 -0.211 -0.074 -0.020 0.435
14 0.027 0.027 0.327 0.012 0.033 -0.195 -0.091 -0.022 0.397
15 0.025 0.025 0.281 0.009 0.032 -0.178 -0.113 -0.024 0.357
16 0.023 0.023 0.234 0.005 0.032 -0.158 -0.145 -0.026 0.312
17 0.021 0.021 0.188 0.002 0.031 -0.136 -0.194 -0.029 0.264
18 0.020 0.020 0.141 -0.002 0.031 -0.111 -0.278 -0.033 0.211
19 0.019 0.019 0.094 -0.007 0.031 -0.081 -0.452 -0.038 0.151
20
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UCtþ1
UCt
¼ 1 þ r
1 þ FKt  d
UCtþ1 FRtþ1 þ UEtþ1 ERtþ1
UCt FRt þ UEt ERt
¼ 1 þ r
1 þ g Stð Þ
UEtþ1 EMtþ1
UEt EMt
¼ 1 þ r
1 þ h Ztð Þ
ð7:5Þ
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